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1 Introduction
In Europe, Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) from the transport sector ac-
counted for 25% in 2017 of total emissions1. In Ireland, the situation is
similar, in 2018 60% of the GHG are energy related emissions and trans-
portation accounted for 40% of them 2. Increasing carbon taxes has emerged
as a key policy instrument to reduce emissions in this sector. The economic
literature shows that carbon taxes on road transport fuels can encourage
drivers to take fewer car trips and encourage them to buy more efficient ve-
hicles (see Borger and Rouwendal, 2014; Fullerton et al., 2015). In addition,
it is argued that currently, taxes on fuels used in private transportation do
not reflect the externalities ( e.g. local pollution, congestion, accidents, etc)
caused by vehicle use (Parry, 2015). However, most of the existing liter-
ature finds that low income households are disproportionately affected by
carbon taxation (see Poterba, 1991; West, 2004, 2005; Fullerton and West,
2000). However, current research shows that the tax burden of low income
households due to the regressive nature is not as severe as expected (Sterner,
2012) and can be overcome by revenue recycling policies (Bento et al., 2009).
On the other hand, Sager (2019) shows that savings in CO2 can be eroded
when revenues are recycled. Carbon taxation alone will not be able to reduce
the emissions at the level required by the Paris agreement. In this regard,
Wijkander (1985) investigated the idea that complements or substitutes for
externality-creating goods can also be taxed or subsidised to reduce exter-
nalities. Little attention in the economic literature has been placed on the
estimation of cross effects between public and private transportation. This
article provides new insights to the current debate about decarbonizing the
transport sector by quantifying changes in the distance driven when imple-
menting additional carbon taxes and subsidies for public transportation. In
addition, the article computes the tax burden experienced by vehicle owners
when the externality cost associated with driving is included. Jakob et al.
(2017) found that public resistance to carbon taxes could be due to the fact
that people prefer to tackle the environmental problems they caused them-
selves rather than delegating it to other people via paying carbon taxes.
Consequently, creating awareness of the cost associated with driving could
increase carbon tax acceptability.
Regarding non-carbon pricing policies, Beaudoin and Lin-Lawell (2018)
found that an increase of 10% in infrastructure for public transportation in
1EUROSTAT, Greenhouse gas emission statistics
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the U.S. over the years 1991-2011 led to an increase in auto travel of 0.4%.
Yang et al. (2018) found that each of the subway openings in Beijing, drops
vehicle congestion sharply. Regarding the distributive effects of subsidies for
public transit, Börjesson et al. (2020) found that subsidies for public trans-
portation are not effective as a redistribution policy in Stockholm. The same
conclusion was reached by Bureau and Glachant (2011) using French data.
Implementing major sustainable-mobility projects such as the expansion of
the Dublin Area Rapid Transit (DART), Metro Link, and the Bus Connects
Programme are important elements in the Irish Climate Action Plan. Bus
Connects targets a 50% increase in bus passenger numbers over the lifetime
of the project in the country major cities by investing in infrastructure to
increase safety and comfort when travelling.
Carbon taxation will bring changes in the consumption patterns of the
energy consumed for heating and transportation. In addition, subsidies
for public transit will also affect the demand for private transportation.
A demand system approach allows quantifying changes in energy demand
for private transportation taking into account cross-price effects associated
with changes in the price of other commodities (i.e. heating or public trans-
portation). While there are numerous studies that use a demand system
to analyse the distributional effects of carbon pricing is considerably large
(see; Baker et al., 1989; Labandeira and Labeaga, 1999; Labandeira et al.,
2006; Tiezzi and Verde, 2016; Böhringer et al., 2017; Creedy and Sleeman,
2006; Pashardes et al., 2014; Tovar Reaños and Wölfing, 2018), few studies
are on the distributional effects of increasing taxes via fuel prices for private
transportation. Even fewer analyse the relationship between public and pri-
vate transportation. A demand system represents the demand of different
commodities as a function of total expenditure and commodity prices. This
approach requires assumptions about the income expansion paths, known as
Engel curves. Engel curves describe how household expenditure on a par-
ticular commodity changes across different levels of income. The existing
literature assumes linear (see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980) or quadratic
Engel curves (see Banks et al., 1997). The Affine Stone Index (EASI) im-
plicit Marshallian demand system proposed by Lewbel and Pendakur (2009)
allows for more flexibility when modeling Engel curves.
Regarding demand-system approaches that analyse the incidence of in-
creasing taxes via fuel prices, West and Williams (2007) assumed linear
Engel curves and compute the optimal schedules for petrol taxes under
efficiency consideration. Nikodinoska and Schröder (2016) use a demand
system approach to analyse the distributional effects of increasing taxes via
petrol prices. They assume quadratic Engel curves and find that there is
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a trade off between equity and environmental targets when there is no rev-
enue recycling. Tiezzi and Verde (2016) use a similar approach and find that
changes in petrol taxes have significantly greater impacts on petrol demand
than market-induced changes in petrol prices. They include public trans-
portation in their estimation and find that these commodities are comple-
ments. Tiezzi and Verde (2019) analyse the equity implications of responses
to market-induced and increasing petrol taxes. Tiezzi and Verde (2016,
2019) are the most recent studies that include public transportation in their
model. They found that increases in petrol prices reduces demand for public
transportation. Quantifying the tax burden when the cost of pollution is
taken into account has not yet been examined. In this regard, Tovar-Reanos
(2020) uses a one equation model for the distance driven (i.e. neglecting
cross effects) and finds that when the cost of air pollution is included in the
metric for the tax incidence, the tax burden decreases considerably.
The insights provided in this paper are threefold. First: own, cross and
expenditure elasticities are estimated related to demand for petrol and diesel
used for private transportation. Second, additional carbon taxes on fuels
for heating and transportation are simulated to quantify the tax incidence
experience by vehicle owners. The externality cost associated with driving
is estimated and included when computing the tax incidence. Finally, we
estimate the environmental and distributional effects of a lump-sum transfer
and subsidies for public transportation.
The estimated cross price elasticities for private and public transporta-
tion show that while for low income households these commodities are com-
plementary, for more affluent households they are substitute. Regarding
welfare losses, it is found that the tax is regressive, as measured by equiv-
alent variation, but recycling carbon taxation revenues to households can
mitigate these regressive effects. Regressivity decreases considerably when
the cost associated with the externalities of driving are taken into account.
It is also found that affluent households have the largest average CO2 emis-
sions per kilometre. In addition, subsidies for public transportation has
superior environmental outcomes but it is not a good instrument for dis-
tributing additional revenues. This paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes the methodology and the models which we estimate later. Section
4 describes the data used in combination with descriptive statistics. The
results are presented in Section 5. Section 7 concludes.
3
2 Methodology
2.1 The Affine Stone Index (EASI) implicit Marshallian de-
mand system
The methodology employed here is similar to that of Tovar Reaños and
Wölfing (2018) where after estimating the EASI demand system from micro-
data, changes in welfare at the household and aggregated level are estimated.
The EASI (Lewbel and Pendakur, 2009) provides a first-order approxima-
tion of an arbitrary expenditure function from which a demand system can
be derived. The estimated expenditure function must have all the proper-
ties that hold for a theoretical expenditure function (Varian, 1992). Pothen
and Tovar Reaños (2018) have recently used this approach to analyse the
footprints associated with consumption patterns. The generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator or an iterated linear approximation can be
used to estimate the demand system. Lewbel and Pendakur propose the
following expenditure function:





































and where pi are commodity prices, y is the implicit household utility,
and zl are demographic characteristics. R is chosen by the modeller and
determines the degree of the polynomial mi. This specification allows for
highly flexible Engel curves while still keeping the functional form quite com-
prehensible. ai,j,l, bi,j , bi,r, di,l and gil are the parameters to be estimated.
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εi represents, unobserved preference heterogeneity. Lewbel and Pendakur















j bi,j log(pi) log(pj)
(3)
By applying Shephard’s lemma to the cost function embedded in expres-


















di,lzl log y + εi.
(4)
Lewbel and Pendakur show that (4) can also be estimated with an ap-
proximation of y, instead of using Equation (3). The authors approximate y
by using log(x)−
∑
i w̄ilog(pi) where w̄i is the mean of the budget share. We
use this approach in order to reduce the computational burden of estimating
the parameters of the system. We estimate the parameters using three-stage
least squares (3SLS).
As in West and Williams an inverse Mills ratio is computed to correct for
the bias introduced by excluding households without a car in my sample.
A two-step version of the Heckman correction procedure is used. In the
first stage, a probit model on the dichotomous choice to own a vehicle is
run to calculate the inverse Mills ratio for each household. In the second
stage, the estimated Mills ratio is introduced in each of the equations in
the demand system estimation. The probit model includes as independent
variable whether there are dependent children in the household, the town
size, whether there is a garage in the dwelling and the logarithm of the public
transfers received by the households. Standard errors for the estimated
coefficients of the demand system and elasticities are computed by using
bootstrap methods.
3Note that log(x) = log [C(p, y)]
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ai,j,l = aj,i,l and
∑
i
ai,j,l = 0 ∀ l,








gi,l = 0 ∀ l,∑
i
bi,r = 0 for r 6= 0,∑
i
bi,r = 1 for r = 0,
(5)
Lewbel (1989) is followed to create more variation in commodity prices
and further improve identification of associated parameters. Once the pa-
rameters in equation 4 are estimated, own-price elasticities (OPE) and ex-

















We can describe the impacts of changes in welfare by estimating Hicks’s
equivalent variation (HEV). HEV = C(p0, U1) − C(p0, U0), where U is
the level of household utility. This follows Creedy and Sleeman (2006) and



















































”‘Equivalent income” (xe) is the income level required in order to achieve
the utility that prevails under the current income level, but at a different
set of prices.4 Tovar Reaños and Wölfing (2018) show that (xe) can be
estimated as xe = Total Expenditure − Hicks′equivalent variation. In my
simulation exercise, a Gini coefficient is calculated to analyze changes in the
distribution of equivalent income.
2.2 Tax revenues, emissions and driving behaviour
As in West (2004), the government has the following budget constrain. The
right hand side of Equation (10) represents the additional revenues raised
by the carbon tax on fuel i (i.e. i=fuels used for heating and private trans-
portation) . The left hand side represents the lump-sum transfers. The
demand system is used to provide changes in consumption patterns after
taxes (i.e. Q1ih) for each household and commodity.∑
h,i




The level of CO2 emissions associated with heating and private trans-
portation is estimated using the 2016 wave of the Household Budget Survey
(HBS). Weekly fuel expenditure is translated into CO2 emissions using fuel
prices and emissions factors provided by the Sustainable Energy Authority
of Ireland (SEAI). Emission factors and energy prices used in the estimation
are displayed in Table 1. Emission factors are taken from SEAI (2015) and
the prices are weighted averages from my own estimation based on informa-
tion provided by the SEAI.
Table 1: Emission factors and fuel prices
Fuel Emissions (g CO2/kWh) Cost e/kWh
Gas 204.7 0.080
Oil (kerosene) 257.0 0.078
Solid Fuels 357.0 0.068
Petrol 252.0 0.144
Diesel 264.0 0.121
Data sources from SEAI (2015) and directly from SEAI
4Note that this definition is distinct from an unrelated definition of ‘equivalent income’
that appears elsewhere in the economic literature, namely that of a measure of income by
a household member that accounts for household composition and economies of scale.
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factori ∗ (Q0hi −Q1hi) (11)
where Qi is the quantity demanded of energy for heating and private
transportation, factori is the emission factor per kWh. It is estimated
using information displayed in Table 1 and it is assumed to be fixed across
the simulation. The index i denotes the quantity demanded for heating and
private transportation, and the indices 0 and 1 denotes the base and the
simulated scenario.
2.3 Externality cost of driving
The cost associated with driving is computed using the costs in eper kilo-
metre provided by van Essen et al. (2019). They provide cost for air pol-
lution, climate change, noise and the cost associated with producing petrol
and diesel. These values are provided for diesel and petrol cars in differ-
ent categories of the ratio CO2 gr/km. The values are also provided for
rural and urban roads. For the cost associated with air pollution van Essen
et al. (2019) include, damages in health, crop losses, material and building
damages ( e.g. damages of building facades through particles and dust)
and biodiversity loss. As for climate change costs, they are defined as the
costs associated with all of the effects of global warming, such as sea level
rise, biodiversity loss, water management issues, more and more frequent
weather extremes and crop failures. The externality cost at household level






∗ wgk ∗Kmh (12)
where wgk is the budget share devoted to the purchase of the k fuel
(i.e. petrol and diesel). wgk is needed given that the HBS does not provide
information on the driven distance broken down by vehicle type. Kmh is the
distance driven. The ratio CO2 gr/km is estimated by dividing the emission
estimated in the base scenario and the reported annual driven distance in
the HBS. This is done in order to impute the externality costs provided by
van Essen et al. (2019).




∗ (Q0h −Q1h) (13)
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estimated using the demand system.
3 Data Set and Descriptive Statistics
The dataset employed in this work is the Household Budget Survey (HBS),
conducted by the Central Statistical Office (CSO) every five years. The
purpose of the survey is to determine a detailed pattern of household expen-
diture, which in turn is used to update the weighting basis of the Consumer
Price Index5. The waves from 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2015-2016 are
used in a pooled cross-sectional manner. Indices for commodity prices for
the same years provided by the CSO are also used. For the purpose of this
study, the consumption goods were grouped into several categories: food,
housing, lighting and heating (which we also term “heating” throughout the
course of this paper), public transportation and communication (i.e. ex-
penditure on bus, train, taxi, telephone and internet bills), fuel (i.e. petrol
and diesel) education and leisure, and other goods and services. This ag-
gregation is similar to that used in Tovar Reaños and Wölfing (2018). In
addition, this aggregation minimizes corner solutions (i.e. zero reported ex-
penditures). Public transportation and communication are also aggregated
in one commodity in order to include in the estimation vehicle owners that
do not use public transportation. This category is dominated by expendi-
ture on transportation by bus, train and taxi, thereby we term this category
“Public transportation” throughout the course of this paper). This group-
ing largely follows the Classification of Individual Consumption According
to Purpose (COICOP). As in Baker et al. (1989), I do not include the pur-
chase of vehicles and white goods appliances. Instead, dummy variables for
ownership of these goods are included in the analysis. Summary statistics
for the full dataset are shown in Table 9. In addition, dummy variables are
included for whether a dwelling is in a rural area (according to the CSO
classification of same), the age of the dwelling, whether the dwelling has gas
fired central heating, a washing machine, and dishwasher and a fridge.
4 Microsimulation data and scenarios
The demand system estimated above is used to simulate the effect of carbon
taxation on expenditure on the various commodity groups. For the purposes
5See https://www.cso.ie/en/methods/housingandhouseholds/householdbudgetsurvey/
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Scenario Description Expenditure change Price change
NoTax No increase in tax NO NO
Tax Tax NO YES
TaxRev Tax and lump-sum YES YES
TaxSub Tax and subsidy for public transportation NO YES
Table 2: Scenario overview
of the microsimulation, we use the 2015-2016 wave of the HBS as it has the
most recent data available. We simulate the impact of increasing carbon
taxation by 100 eper tonne, which according to Klenert et al. (2018) is the
level required in order to reach the goals set in the Paris agreement. A carbon
tax was introduced in 2010 in Ireland which applies to non-ETS emissions at
e20 per tonne. Consequently, the simulated carbon tax is 120 eper tonne
on the carbon contained in fuels for heating and private transportation.
Note that only vehicle owners are considered in my simulation. Carbon
taxes combined with a revenue recycling scheme are also simulated, where
the revenue from carbon taxation is distributed via a lump sum payment
to each household, colloquially known as a “green cheque”. In addition, a
reduction in 5% in the price of public transportation is also simulated. Table
2 summarises these scenarios and whether prices or household expenditure
effects are expected .
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Elasticities
Tables 3 and 4 shows the own price and expenditure elasticities for each
commodity group and for the first and fourth expenditure quartiles. In gen-
eral the size of the estimated own price elasticities for fuels used in private
transportation are in line with current studies (e.g. Graham and Glaister,
2002; Goodwin et al., 2004; Bureau, 2011; Tovar-Reanos, 2020). As for the
rest of the own price elasticities, own price elasticities (OPE) for heating are
in line with estimates found in the literature (see Pothen and Tovar Reaños,
2018; Salotti et al., 2015). Clements et al. (2006) study expenditure elastic-
ities for 45 different OECD countries and report their average expenditure
elasticity for transport as 1.58. My estimates are within these two estimates.
Table 3 shows also cross price elasticities for public and private trans-
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portation. One can see that while for low income households, subsidies for
public transit will reduce the demand for fuels used for private transporta-
tion, for more affluent households, the opposite is the effect and it is very
small. Regarding, fuels for heating, increases in the price of this commodity
will increase the demand for private transportation for low and high expen-
diture levels. As for expenditure elasticities, we see in Table 4 that public
transportation and petrol and diesel are necessity commodities given that
expenditure elasticities are not greater than one. Consequently increases in
the price of these commodities can be regressive.
Table 3: Own- and cross-price elasticities
Food Housing Heating Pub. Tran. Fuel Education Other
First quartile
Food -0.671 0.060 0.102 0.070 0.103 0.107 0.063
Housing -0.083 -0.778 0.005 0.017 0.014 -0.016 0.143
Heating -0.012 -0.016 -0.473 0.060 0.060 -0.027 -0.153
Pub. Tran. -0.152 -0.026 0.014 -0.604 -0.064 0.015 -0.070
Fuel -0.053 -0.041 0.025 -0.091 -0.567 -0.024 -0.055
Education -0.095 -0.154 -0.126 -0.049 -0.087 -0.922 0.099
Others -0.273 -0.177 -0.267 -0.245 -0.236 -0.185 -1.163
Forth quartile
Food -0.930 0.009 0.043 0.080 0.038 0.076 -0.026
Housing 0.059 -0.704 0.093 0.082 0.085 0.010 0.073
Heating 0.032 -0.017 -0.515 0.107 -0.006 -0.138 -0.317
Pub. Tran. 0.096 -0.029 0.034 -1.026 0.005 0.019 -0.070
Fuel -0.003 -0.042 -0.003 0.019 -0.695 -0.066 -0.092
Education -0.057 -0.151 -0.109 -0.082 -0.103 -1.244 0.132
Others -0.122 -0.104 -0.115 -0.108 -0.104 0.001 -1.117
All entries are statistically significant at the 5% level
Table 4: Expenditure elasticities
Food Housing Heating Pub. Tran. Fuel Education Other
First quartile 0.581 0.678 0.035 0.809 0.510 1.643 1.732
Forth quartile 0.741 0.216 0.117 0.937 0.481 1.488 1.234
All entries are statistically significant at the 5% level
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5.2 Welfare changes at household level
Table 5 shows the estimated Hicks Equivalent Variation (HEV) for vehicle
owners relative to total expenditure for three type of households. House-
holds with children have an average driving distance above the sample mean.
In addition, households in retirement age might experience energy poverty
(see Meier and Rehdanz, 2010) and carbon taxes on the price of fuels for
heating and transportation can make their situation worse. One can see that
carbon taxes imposes a disproportional burden on low income households
when there is no revenue re-allocation and environmental damages are not
considered. One and two adult families with children face the largest burden
under the tax scenario. While a lump-sum transfer and subsidies for pub-
lic transportation reduce the tax incidence, the first instrument dominates
regarding its distributional properties. In particular, one can see that for
couples with children, subsidies for public transportation does not reduce the
regressive effect of the tax as the lump-sum does. Consequently, when subsi-
dies for public transportation are implemented, it should be considered that
low income households might not profit from this policy as much as more
affluent households. For instance low income households in retirement age
are entitled to travel by free so this policy does not have any compensating
effect for this household type. Lack of availability of public transportation,
will make this policy regressive for low income and rural households.
Table 5: HEV relative to total expenditure (%)
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile
Tax
Single +65 -2.944 -2.163 -1.926 -2.150
Single with children -3.832 -2.966 -2.130 -2.220
2 adults with children -3.364 -2.956 -2.482 -1.843
TaxRev
Single +65 -1.267 -1.019 -0.982 -1.222
Single with children -1.696 -1.500 -1.182 -1.278
2 adults with children -1.594 -1.531 -1.413 -1.156
TaxSub
Single +65 -2.013 -1.578 -1.581 -1.876
Single with children -2.720 -2.341 -1.823 -2.007
2 adults with children -2.558 -2.418 -2.184 -1.703
Graph 1 shows welfare losses for rural and urban households. One can
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Figure 1: HEV relative to expenditure for rural and urban households
see the that carbon taxes impose a larger burden on rural households than
urban ones. In the analyzed sample, while in rural Ireland the mean daily
driven distance is 61 km, urban households drive around 45 km. Differences
in the provision of public transportation in rural and urban areas has been
identified as a barrier to transit towards a more sustainable transportation
system in Ireland (see Browne et al., 2011).
Table 6 displays the estimates of Hicks equivalent variation relative to
household expenditure estimated using the QUAIDS and the EASI demand
systems. One can see that the Quadratic Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS)
which assumes quadratic Engel curves (see Banks et al., 1997), slightly over
estimate the incidence for low income households.
13
Table 6: HEV relative to total expenditure (%)











5.3 Welfare changes and the cost of pollution
Graph 2 displays the ratio of emissions per kilometer for diesel and petrol
vehicles across expenditure levels. This shows that higher income levels
have larger levels of pollution regarding vehicle use. Similarly, Tovar-Reanos
(2020) found that large vehicles have larger CO2 emissions compared to
other vehicle types. If more affluent households have preferences for large
vehicles that potentially have larger emissions ratios per km, carbon taxes
on fuel prices need to be jointly designed by other policies such as motor
and registration taxes. Currently in Ireland, the registration tax and motor
tax was changed in July 2008 from engine size to carbon emissions. These
taxes are based on vehicle emissions rather than emissions at the household
level. This distinction becomes relevant when households own more than
one vehicle.
Graph 3 shows the mean externality cost across expenditure levels. The
values have been equivilised by household size. One can see that the cost in-
creases for more affluent households. Graph 4 shows the incidence using the
Hicks Equivalent Variation (HEV) when externality costs associated with
driving are taken into account (e.g. cost of pollution−|HEV |Total Expenditure ). One can see that
the incidence reduces significantly across all expenditure levels. The change
in the incidence is particularly important for the first two deciles. Increases
in fuel prices used in private transportation via carbon taxes is a policy
instrument that can internalize the externalities associated with the vehicle
usage. However, its implementation has shown not to be a trivial matter.
Increasing the current carbon taxes above e26 per tonne has proven to be a
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Figure 2: Household-emissions per km for diesel and petrol vehicles
15
Figure 3: Externality cost
real challenge regarding public acceptance in Ireland. The results show that
considering the externality cost associated with driving, can reduce the tax
incidence of a carbon taxes on heating and transportation fuels that vehicle
owners experience. Note that the externality cost associated with the use
of fuels for heating is not considered and consequently, the incidence can be
further reduced.
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Figure 4: HEV including and excluding externality costs relative to expen-
diture.
5.4 Aggregate effects
The first row, in Table 7 displays the weekly emissions estimated for vehicle
owners in 2016, the average daily driven kilometers and the revenue col-
lected as a percentage of total expenditure. The following rows display the
changes in these variables with respect to the base scenario. One can see
that a carbon tax reduces emissions by 8% and increases inequality by 1%.
The revenue-allocation scenario reduces the environmental benefits and the
inequality caused by the tax. Under this scenario, 1% in emission reduction
can be lost. Using subsidies for public transportation to reduce the inci-
dence of the tax, reduces further emissions levels but increases inequality
more than the revenue re-allocation scenario. When simulating the effects
of subsidies for public transportation, the additional tax revues are not to-
tally used. In this scenario, the rest of the tax revenues could be used to
compensate low income households. The same pattern can be seen for the
distance driven. One can see that subsidies for public transport increases
the participation of the transport sector in the change in CO2 emissions.
In order to analyse the robustness of my estimates, Table 8 provides
the same metrics as Table 7 using the QUAIDS. While the same trends
are found, changes in emissions and driving distance are slightly smaller at
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Table 7: Changes in emissions, distance driven and revenue using the EASI
demand system
Scenario CO2 Km Revenue Gini
Base (Weekly 1000T) 97.146 (Daily mean Km) 51.280 (%) 0.245
∆ w.r.t to Base (%)
Tax -8.361 -3.761 1.908 1.226
TaxRev -7.716 -3.068 0.000 0.860
TaxSub -8.699 -4.117 1.091 0.953
aggregate level than the one estimated with the EASI demand system. It
also over estimates the tax incidence.
Table 8: Changes in emissions, distance driven and revenue using the
QUAIDS model
Scenario CO2 Km Revenue Gini
Base (Weekly 1000T) 97.146 (Daily mean Km) 51.280 (%) 0.245
∆ w.r.t to Base (%)
Tax -8.253 -3.651 1.908 1.275
TaxRev -7.600 -2.951 0.000 0.851
TaxSub -8.575 -3.990 1.091 0.998
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6 Policy implications
Carbon tax is a policy instrument that can internalize the externalities
associated with vehicle usage. However, its implementation bring several
challenges for policy makers. Setting the level of taxes according to the
externality cost is the first challenge. In addition, carbon taxes need to
be implemented alongside other policy instruments (i.e. subsidies for pub-
lic transportation, working from home, taxes on motor taxes, congestion
charges) to reduce emissions. It is important to design policies where drivers
that are overcharged by carbon taxes can be compensated and higher taxes
can be implemented for those that are undercharged. Addressing concerns
about the distributional effects of the tax can increase public acceptance.
This paper provides empirical evidence that when the externality cost asso-
ciated with driving is included when computing the carbon-tax incidence,
the regressive effect of the tax reduces sharply. It is also shown that while
subsidies for public transportation can reduce emissions in the private trans-
portation sector, it also increases inequality.
The paper provides evidence that the average emissions per kilometer are
higher for high income households. Feebate schemes (e.g. the French ‘bonus-
malus’ system) might help to achieve environmental goals by reducing the
demand of heavy polluting vehicles. Under this scheme a rebate is paid to
consumers purchasing a fuel-efficient vehicle and a penalty is imposed on
those purchasing gas-guzzlers. However, this could induce increases in the
vehicle stock. Another alternative is to make the purchase price of vehicles
reflect their environmental damage. Hennessy and Tol (2011) show that
in Ireland shifting vehicle registration (tax on purchases) and motor taxes
(ownership tax) based on engine size to emissions has increased purchases
of diesel vehicles which normally are larger vehicles. This has reduced the
tax revenue on vehicle registration and ownership, shifting the tax burden
from car ownership to car use. Given that current taxes in vehicle use
do not charge for the driving externalities, the gap between the tax paid
and the due tax increases for drivers of vehicles with high emissions factors.
Offering grants for the purchase of electric vehicles are found to be regressive
by Tovar-Reaños and Sommerfeld (2018). They found that these grants will
increase income inequality as mainly high income households could afford
to purchase them. In addition, for households that can afford more than
one vehicle, grants could be indirectly subsidizing ownership of a second
heavy polluting vehicle. Taxes based on the vehicle emissions need to be
considered for the emissions at the household level and not only at vehicle
level. This calls for a better design and combination of policy instruments
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to set the right tax addressing environmental damage and equity issues. A
socially accepted policy must combine the ‘ability to pay ” and “polluters
pay” principles.
7 Conclusions
By using Irish data and a highly flexible demand system, this paper provides
the first empirical evidence that the carbon-tax burden reduces its regres-
sive effect significantly when the externality cost associated with driving
is taken into account.The estimated cross price elasticities for private and
public transportation show that these commodities are complementary for
low income households and are substitute for more affluent households. It is
also found that affluent households have the largest average CO2 emissions
per kilometre which indicates preference for heavy polluting vehicles. In
addition, subsidies for public transportation are found to be a good envi-
ronmental policy but not an instrument for redistribution.
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Appendix: Tables
Table 9: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Budget shares:
ws food 0.217 0.108
ws housing 0.137 0.111
ws heating 0.041 0.027
ws pub. tran. 0.073 0.059
ws fuel 0.044 0.027





log(ppub. tran.) 4.01 0.389
log(pfuel) 3.968 0.336
log(peducation) 3.533 1.02
Total expenditure 1242.8 1590.5
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Table 10: EASI demand system; linear 3 Stage Least Squares estimation,
estimated from equation (4). Selected estimates from equation (4)
Regressor: Dependent variable: budget share for ...
Food Housing Heating Pub. Tran. Fuel Education
Polynomial coefficient:
y1 0.231 0.149 -0.027 -0.007 0.008 -0.350
(0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.014)
y2 -0.115 -0.032 -0.013 -0.003 -0.010 0.116
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
y3 0.018 -0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.010
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
y4 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction terms (bi,j):
ynp1 -0.040 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
ynp2 0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ynp3 0.004 0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ynp4 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ynp5 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ynp6 0.031 -0.010 0.002 0.006 0.003 -0.058
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Price parameter (ai,j,l)
a1,j,l 0.172 -0.040 -0.018 -0.038 -0.003 -0.072
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
a2,j,l -0.040 0.047 -0.008 0.016 -0.010 0.017
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
a3,j,l -0.018 -0.008 0.038 0.010 0.005 -0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
a4,j,l -0.038 0.016 0.010 0.036 -0.007 -0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
a5,j,l -0.003 -0.010 0.005 -0.007 0.034 -0.009
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
a6,j,l -0.072 0.017 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 0.124
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005)
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.018 0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.042
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Constant 0.119 0.088 0.148 0.118 0.072 0.357
(0.006) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.012)
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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